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 PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                        
_____________ 
 
No. 15-2862 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MAXIMO MATEO-MEDINA 
a/k/a David Contreras 
a/k/a Luis Nieves 
a/k/a Joseph Robles, 
 
                                 Appellant 
_____________ 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania                                                          
District Court No. 2-15-cr-00055-1 
District Judge: The Honorable Gerald J. Pappert 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
 
April 18, 2016 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge,1 FUENTES, and ROTH, 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: January 9, 2017)     
 
 
                                                 
1 Judge Theodore McKee concluded his term as Chief of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on 
September 30, 2016. Judge Brooks Smith became Chief 
Judge on October 1, 2016. 
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  OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________________            
 
McKEE, Chief Judge 
 Maximo Mateo-Medina appeals his sentence of twelve 
months plus one day imprisonment for illegally reentering the 
United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(1).  
Although Mateo-Medina pled guilty to the offense, he now 
appeals the sentence, arguing that the sentencing court 
violated his Due Process Clause rights by impermissibly 
considering, among other things, arrests that did not result in 
convictions.  The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) that 
disclosed those arrests did not contain any of the underlying 
conduct.  For the reasons set forth below, we agree and we 
will therefore vacate the sentence that was imposed and 
remand for resentencing. 
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I.  Factual & Procedural Background 
 
 Mateo-Medina, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, 
was initially deported from the United States in December 
2012 after being convicted of unlawfully obtaining a U.S. 
passport and serving a five-month sentence for that offense.  
Shortly after he was deported, his common law wife, 
Milagros Rasuk, a U.S. citizen with whom Mateo-Medina had 
been residing for fifteen years prior to his deportation, was 
diagnosed with terminal colon cancer.  Rasuk had two adult 
children from a prior marriage, both of whom had become 
drug addicts, and one of whom, Miguel, resided with Mateo-
Medina and Rasuk.  Rasuk’s oldest son, Risdael, who suffers 
from mental health issues, had his own child, Angel.  No 
doubt because of Risdael’s drug addiction, he abandoned 
Angel for all practical purposes, and Angel was raised by 
Mateo-Medina and Rasuk.   
 
 When Mateo-Medina received word that Rasuk had 
been diagnosed with terminal cancer, he returned to the 
United States to care for her during her final months of life.  
She died in February 2014.2  Angel was no older than eleven 
when his grandmother, Rasuk, died.  Mateo-Medina 
continued to care for Angel and became his sole caretaker 
following Rasuk’s death.3 
 
 According to Mateo-Medina, Miguel’s continued 
presence in the household became increasingly disruptive and 
problematic following Rasuk’s death because of Miguel’s 
involvement with drugs and alcohol.  Mateo-Medina claims 
that when he (Mateo-Medina) attempted to intercede and 
confront Miguel about his behavior, Miguel reported Mateo-
Medina to the immigration authorities, informed them of his 
illegal reentry, and kicked Mateo-Medina out of the home. 
 
                                                 
2 Mateo-Medina’s mother, who was also a United States 
citizen, died of lung cancer 10 months later. 
3 Angel’s therapist credits Mateo-Medina with providing a 
“stable, reliable, loving environment,” for Angel following 
Rasuk’s death.  Appellant’s Br. at 6 (citing J.A. at 68). 
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 Miguel’s strategy apparently worked because Mateo-
Medina was subsequently arrested and charged with illegal 
reentry.  He thereafter pled guilty to one count of reentry after 
removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). 
 
 Mateo-Medina’s PSR calculated his offense level at 
ten, and his criminal history category was II.  This resulted in 
a recommended sentence of eight to fourteen months’ 
imprisonment.  The PSR noted that Mateo-Medina had two 
previous convictions, one for driving under the influence in 
2000, and one for fraudulently applying for a United States 
passport in 2012.  Mateo-Medina was arrested under a 
different alias each time.  The PSR also noted that Mateo-
Medina had “numerous” arrests that did not lead to 
conviction.4  Aside from the arrests leading to his two 
convictions, Mateo-Medina had been arrested six other times.  
However, each of the charges involved in his arrests had been 
withdrawn or dismissed, except for one which lacked a 
recorded disposition.  As we noted earlier, the PSR did not 
describe any of the underlying conduct purportedly leading to 
those arrests. 
 
 Mateo-Medina argued for a downward departure from 
the suggested eight to fourteen-month guideline range.  The 
District Court did depart downward one level.  The court 
adjusted Mateo-Medina’s Guidelines range downward to six 
to twelve months’ imprisonment based on an offense level of 
nine and a criminal history category of II.  At the sentencing 
hearing, both the prosecutor and the defense argued for a 
sentence of time served, which would have been equivalent to 
roughly six months, or the lower end of the Guidelines range.  
In spite of this, the District Court sentenced Mateo-Medina to 
twelve months plus one day, followed by two years of 
supervised release.5  
                                                 
4 PSR at ¶ 6. 
5 While this sentence was technically an upward variance 
from the Guidelines range of six to 12 months, the sentencing 
court explained that imposing a sentence greater than one 
year would make Mateo-Medina eligible for “good time 
credit” which could reduce his term of imprisonment by 54 
days (15%). 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1). 
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 In calculating Mateo-Medina’s sentence, the District 
Court relied on the relevant factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 
and information contained in the PSR.  Significantly, the 
District Court also relied in part on Mateo-Medina’s record of 
arrests that did not lead to conviction.  The court explained:  
 
I also cannot overlook the defendant’s rather 
extensive and I think we all have our own 
barometer of what is extensive versus what is 
not extensive interaction with the criminal 
justice system. But there were as I counted, I 
believe seven arrests, two convictions in 
three states since 1988. So, the defendant 
who was in this country initially illegally 
since at least the 80s has engaged in conduct 
which to the Court’s view belied and made 
ring hollow a little bit his desire to merely 
come to America to seek a better life.6  
 
II. Standard of Review7 
 
 As a threshold matter, the parties disagree on the 
applicable standard of review.  The Government argues that, 
because Mateo-Medina’s objection to the District Court’s 
statement regarding the defendant’s prior arrest record was 
not preserved at sentencing, it is reviewed for plain error.8  
Under that standard, Mateo-Medina would bear the burden of 
establishing the District Court committed plain error.9  This, 
the Government urges, Mateo-Medina has failed to do 
because, even if he could show plain error, he cannot show 
that it affected the outcome of the proceedings.   
 
                                                 
6 J.A. at 115 (emphasis added). 
7 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(a). 
8 Gov’t Br. at 12; see also United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 
F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc); United States v. 
Couch, 291 F.3d 251, 252-54 (3d Cir. 2002). 
9 Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997). 
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 Mateo-Medina counters that he did indeed preserve the 
issue, and review should therefore be plenary.10  Mateo-
Medina points out that counsel objected to the inclusion of 
the arrest record in the PSR and at the sentencing hearing.  He 
claims that the District Court understood the objection as an 
attempt to exclude the arrests as a sentencing consideration, 
and overruled it based on the court’s (erroneous) view that 
arrests are “appropriate for the Court to consider [] under the 
statutory [sentencing] factors.”11  Thus, in response to a 
defense objection, the District Court expressly ruled on the 
exact issue Mateo-Medina raises on appeal.  Mateo-Medina 
argues that this amounts to preservation, not forfeiture.  We 
need not address whether Mateo-Medina preserved his 
objection at sentencing because our precedent clearly 
demonstrates that a district court’s consideration, even in part, 
of a bare arrest record is plain error.12 
 
III. Discussion 
 
A.  Error 
 
Our review of a criminal sentence “proceeds in two 
stages.”13  First, we review for procedural error, “such as 
failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines 
range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to 
consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a  sentence based on 
clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the 
chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation 
from the Guidelines range.”14  Under the plain error standard, 
a defendant must show: (1) error, (2) that is plain or obvious, 
and (3) that affects a defendant’s substantial rights.15  “If all 
three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise 
                                                 
10 Appellant’s Br. at 3, 12 n.7. 
11 J.A. at 100. 
12 See United States v. Berry, 553 F.3d 273, 281-84 (3d Cir. 
2009). 
13 United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(en banc). 
14 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 
15 United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 539 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(citations omitted). 
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its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the 
error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.”16  If we find procedural 
error “our preferred course is to remand the case for re-
sentencing, without going any further.”17  In the absence of 
procedural error, we will then determine whether the sentence 
imposed was substantively reasonable.  When reviewing for 
substantive reasonableness, “we will affirm [the sentence] 
unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed 
the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons 
the district court provided.”18   
 
Mateo-Medina relies on our opinion in United States v. 
Berry19 to argue that the District Court plainly erred in 
considering his bare record of arrests not leading to 
conviction when imposing his sentence.  There, the 
sentencing judge considered the relevant factors under 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) but also speculated about the reasons why 
the defendants’ robbery charges had been nol prossed.  In the 
process, the prosecutor misread the PSR regarding Berry’s 
bald arrest record.20  
 
The sentencing judge also inflated the defendant’s 
propensity for crime by speculating that it was “rather 
obvious that the reason he doesn’t have any actual adult 
convictions is because of the breakdowns in the court—in the 
                                                 
16 Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 
(1997) (citation omitted)). 
17 United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(citation omitted).  However, on rare occasions, we have 
chosen to proceed to the second step of the analysis, 
substantive reasonableness, despite finding procedural error. 
See United States v. Lychock, 578 F.3d 214, 219-20 (3d Cir. 
2009).  We find Lychock to be the exception rather than the 
rule, as that case concerned a defendant who was found guilty 
of possessing over 150 images of child pornography, but who 
received no jail term at sentencing, and where the district 
court provided no reasonable rationale for its actions.   
18 Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568. 
19 553 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2009). 
20 Berry, 553 F.3d at 277. 
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state court system—and not because of innocence.”21  The 
court also considered appropriate factors under Section 
3553(a) such as the seriousness of the crimes of conviction.  
However, in imposing the sentence on Berry and his 
codefendant, the court explained:  
 
Taking all those factors in to account, given 
the fact that their criminal points . . .  I don’t 
think reflect quite adequately, the seriousness 
of their criminal exposure in the past. The 
fact that they were charged with crimes and 
then, the prosecution was dropped because 
nobody showed up to prosecute or something 
like that, means that their criminal history 
points were probably understated.22 
 
 
 Berry appealed, arguing that the district court should 
not have considered, even in part, his bald arrest record, when 
those arrests did not lead to a conviction.  He also argued that 
the sentencing court erred in speculating about why some 
prior charges were nol prossed and assuming he was guilty of 
offenses that were dismissed.  Because neither Berry nor his 
codefendant objected during sentencing, we reviewed for 
plain error.23  We specifically noted as a threshold matter 
“that resentencing would be required here even without the 
district court’s speculation about the reasons for prior charges 
being nol prossed because of the misstatement of the 
defendant’s arrest record and the district court’s misreading 
of the PSRs.”24  Further, we explained: 
 
A defendant cannot be deprived of liberty 
based upon mere speculation. We therefore 
follow the reasoning of the majority of our 
sister appellate courts and hold that a bare 
arrest record—without more—does not 
justify an assumption that a defendant has 
                                                 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 279. 
23 553 F.3d at 279. 
24 Id. at 280. 
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committed other crimes and it therefore 
cannot support increasing his/her sentence in 
the absence of adequate proof of criminal 
activity.25   
 
Here, the District Court also not only considered but 
misstated Mateo-Medina’s prior arrests.26  While the District 
Court considered a host of relevant factors under 
Section 3553(a), it also erroneously and puzzlingly relied on 
his misstated bald arrest record, stating: 
 
I also cannot overlook the defendant’s rather 
extensive and I think we all have our own 
barometer of what is extensive versus what is 
not extensive interaction with the criminal 
justice system. But there were as I counted, I 
believe seven arrests [actually six], two 
convictions in three states since 1988.27 
The Government argues that these statements indicate 
only the District Court’s doubt as to Mateo-Medina’s 
credibility in stating his reasons to return to the United States, 
not his criminal nature, a point that the government terms the 
“crucial” distinguishing factor between Berry and this case.28  
However, Mateo-Medina had only two convictions in the 
United States since 1988; one was a fifteen-year-old DUI, and 
                                                 
25 Id. at 284. 
26 Although 18 U.S.C. § 3661 provides that "[n]o limitation 
shall be placed on the information concerning the 
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted for 
an offense which a court in the United States may receive and 
consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate 
sentence," such information must be reliable.  See Berry, 553 
F.3d at 279-80 (explaining that facts considered at sentencing 
must be proved by preponderance of the evidence to satisfy 
requirements of Due Process Clause).  As explained more 
fully herein, the bare arrest record relied on by the District 
Court in this case does not meet this requirement of 
reliability. 
27 J.A. at 115. 
28 Gov’t Br. at 17. 
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the other was for the passport violation for which he was 
deported in 2012.  It strains credulity to argue, as the 
Government does, that the sentencing court was referring 
only to these two convictions as an extensive interaction with 
the criminal justice system.    
  
Accordingly, we conclude that, given our holding in 
Berry, the District Court’s consideration of Mateo-Medina’s 
record of prior arrests that did not lead to conviction was 
plain error under the circumstances here.  
 
The Government next argues that: 
 
It was certainly not unreasonable for the 
district court to consider that persons 
genuinely occupied with the care of a 
terminally ill relative and a child typically do 
not have numerous interactions with the 
criminal justice system.29 
 
 This argument is both irrelevant and illogical. It 
assumes that one in Mateo-Medina’s circumstance who is 
caring for a terminally ill relative does not venture outside the 
confines of the home—a nonsensical proposition.  It also 
ignores the rationale that we clearly explained in Berry:  
 
[R]eliance on arrest records may also 
exacerbate sentencing disparities arising 
from economic, social and/or racial factors.  
For example, officers in affluent 
neighborhoods may be very reluctant to 
arrest someone for behavior that would 
readily cause an officer in the proverbial 
“high crime” neighborhood to make an 
arrest.  A record of a prior arrest may, 
therefore, be as suggestive of a defendant’s 
                                                 
29 Gov’t Br. at 19. 
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demographics as his/her potential for 
recidivism or his/her past criminality.30 
Since we wrote Berry, substantial research and 
commentary has only reinforced the regrettable circumstances 
that we emphasized in disallowing consideration of bare 
arrest records at sentencing.  In 2013, The Sentencing Project 
released a shadow report to the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee, Regarding Racial Disparities in the United States 
Criminal Justice System (Sentencing Project Report).31  The 
Sentencing Project Report pointed to a wide body of 
scholarship indicating that socioeconomic factors influenced 
disparities in arrest rates.32   
 
The Sentencing Project Report also remarked on recent 
research indicating that police are more likely to stop, and 
arrest, people of color due to implicit bias.  Implicit bias, or 
stereotyping, consists of the unconscious assumptions that 
humans make about individuals, particularly in situations that 
                                                 
30 Berry, 553 F.3d at 285 (citing Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, 
Youthful Indiscretions: Culture, Class Status, and the 
Passage to Adulthood, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 743 (2002); Jane 
W. Gibson–Carpenter & James E. Carpenter, Race, Poverty, 
and Justice: Looking Where the Streetlight Shines, 3–SPG 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 99, 101 (1994) (“Police officers who 
have worked in many types of neighborhoods acknowledge 
that they call home to middle-class parents more readily.  
Between suburban and urban departments, the difference can 
be even more striking.  A department of college-educated 
officers in a suburb of Minneapolis in the 1970s went so far 
as to invite parents and children into the station to discuss 
their problems confidentially, with virtual immunity from 
formal handling.”)).  
31 The Sentencing Project, Report of The Sentencing Project 
to the United Nations Human Rights Committee Regarding 
Racial Disparities in the United States Criminal Justice 
System (August 2013), available at 
http://sentencingproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/Race-and-Justice-Shadow-Report-
ICCPR.pdf (hereinafter Sentencing Project Report). 
32 Sentencing Project Report at 3. 
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require rapid decision-making, such as police encounters.33  
“Extensive research has shown that in such situations the vast 
majority of Americans of all races implicitly associate black 
Americans with adjectives such as ‘dangerous,’ ‘aggressive,’ 
‘violent,’ and ‘criminal.’”34   
 
In addition, a recent empirical study analyzed thirteen 
years’ worth of data on race, socioeconomic factors, drug use, 
and drug arrests.35  The study found that African-Americans, 
Hispanics, and whites used drugs in roughly the same 
percentages, and in roughly the same ways.36  The study 
controlled for variables such as whether the participant lived 
in high-crime, gang-controlled areas.  Despite those controls, 
the study concluded that “in early adulthood, race disparities 
in drug arrest[s] grew substantially; as early as age 22, 
African-Americans had 83% greater odds of a drug arrest 
than whites and at age 27 this disparity was 235%.”37  With 
respect to Hispanics, the study found that socioeconomic 
factors such as residing in an inner-city neighborhood 
accounted for much of the disparity in drug arrest rates.38 
                                                 
33 Id. at 3-4. 
34 Id. at 4 (internal citations omitted). 
35 Ojmarrh Mitchell & Michael S. Caudy, Examining Racial 
Disparities in Drug Arrests, JUSTICE QUARTERLY (Jan. 2013), 
available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2012.761721. 
36 Id. at 22 (“Contrary to popular explanations of racial 
disparities in drug arrest[s], this research found that the racial 
disparity in drug arrests between black and whites cannot be 
explained by race differences in the extent of drug offending, 
nor the nature of drug offending. In fact, in this sample, 
African-Americans (and Hispanics) were no more, and often 
less, likely to be involved in drug offending than whites. 
Further, while minorities were more likely to live in the kinds 
of neighborhoods with heavy police emphasis on drug control 
and living in such neighborhoods had a strong relationship to 
drug arrest; neighborhood context explained only a small 
portion of racial disparity in drug arrests between African-
Americans and whites.”)  
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
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Accordingly, we conclude here, as we did in Berry, 
that the District Court plainly erred when it considered 
Mateo-Medina’s bare arrest record when imposing sentence. 
 
B. Substantial Rights 
 
Having concluded that the sentencing court committed 
plain error in considering Mateo-Medina’s record of prior 
arrests, we turn next to the question of whether the error 
violated Mateo-Medina’s substantial rights.  As explained in 
United States v. Marcus,39 errors that violate substantial rights 
“[i]n the ordinary case” must be “‘prejudicial,’ which means 
that there must be a reasonable probability that the error 
affected the outcome of the trial.”40 
 
Here, as we have explained, the sentencing court 
erroneously considered Mateo-Medina’s bare arrest record 
when determining the length of his sentence.  It did so in spite 
of the prosecution and defense counsel agreeing to a lighter 
sentence and in spite of Mateo-Medina’s minimal record of 
only two prior convictions for nonviolent offenses since the 
1980s.  We realize that the sentencing court also referenced 
numerous other factors that were appropriate to consider in 
deciding upon Mateo-Medina’s sentence.  However, that is no 
more palliative here than it was in Berry.  The District 
Court’s determination of an appropriate sentence for Mateo-
Medina was nevertheless influenced by the impermissible 
consideration of Mateo-Medina’s arrest record.  We think it 
highly unlikely that the court was thereafter able to unring the 
bell when considering the guidelines or the factors contained 
in Section 3553(a).  As we said in Berry, “The guidelines are, 
after all, purely advisory, and unsupported speculation about 
a defendant’s background is problematic whether it results in 
an upward departure, denial of a downward departure, or 
causes the sentencing court to evaluate the § 3553(a) factors 
with a jaundiced eye.”41  Here, for example, the sentencing 
                                                 
39 560 U.S. 258 (2010). 
40 Id. at 262 (citations omitted). 
41 553 F.3d at 281 (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 
220 (2005). 
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court stated that Mateo-Medina’s prior interactions with the 
police made his statement that he came to the United States to 
seek a better life “ring hollow.”42  We therefore conclude that 
the court’s improper consideration of his bare arrest record 
affected the entire sentencing hearing and resulted in 
prejudicial error.  
 
Finally, calculating a person’s sentence based on 
crimes for which he or she was not convicted undoubtedly 
undermines the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of 
judicial proceedings. 
 
Thus, all four plain error factors are met here, and 
resentencing is required. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will remand the matter 
to the District Court for resentencing.43 
                                                 
42 J.A. at 115. 
43 While Mateo-Medina has finished his term of incarceration, 
he remains subject to the remainder of his two-year term of 
supervised release, with all of the restrictions that supervised 
release entails.  We are confident that resentencing that 
accurately reflects Mateo-Medina’s minor criminal history 
will afford him some relief from those restrictions. 
